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Abstract
Community currencies are alternative currencies,
which enable the mobilization of local resources for
local needs and building resilient communities. They
allow community members to perform economic
transactions like buying products and paying for
services using an alternative currency as a medium of
exchange. For decades, regional, paper-based
community currencies have been in use across the
world. With the advent of the digital age, community
currencies are increasingly moving into the digital
space. Digital Community Currencies (DCCs) create
opportunities for addressing challenges that traditional
community currencies are facing, such as the
inconvenience of handling two currencies in one wallet
and the geographic limitation to a limited user
population. This research builds upon characteristics
and challenges of community currencies and derives
six design principles from a literature review, an
analysis of 16 community currency projects and an
interview with a community currency project manager
at the end of the project’s life. The design principles
serve as a basis for establishing resilient and scalable
DCCs. They contribute to the limited IS research on
phenomena of social sustainability and have major
practical implications when implemented in existing
community currency systems.

1. Introduction
Addressing the grand challenge of sustainability
implies tackling issues across its three dimensions:
Economic, ecological, and social [58]. While
acknowledging the importance of each of these
dimensions, the focus of the Information Systems (IS)
discipline, most notably under the label of Green IS,
has been on the ecological environment [5, 37, 59].
The opportunities for IS to become part of a solution
for societal challenges such as poverty, hunger, and
unemployment are not yet explored exhaustively.
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In 1971, a favela in the Brazilian city of Curitiba
was experiencing great difficulties with waste
utilization, poverty and spreading diseases [43]. The
city mayor realized that despite a difficult economic
situation and great scarcity, the community still
possessed underutilized resources in form of halfempty municipal buses and an oversupply of food that
was growing well in the tropical climate. The mayor
offered bus and food coupons to the community in
exchange for bags of pre-sorted garbage [45]. Soon, a
variety of goods could be bought with the coupons and
over 70% of the local population were involved in the
local alternative currency system [34]. There were
initiatives to restore the city, clean the streets and
create jobs, all without financial burdens to anyone
such as raised taxes, loans, charities or redistribution of
wealth.
The Curitiba example is a role model for the use of
alternative currencies, which are simply put ‘local
money’ that can only be used within a certain
neighborhood or town [46]. They do not aim at
replacing national currencies but target social problems
of a community by mobilizing local resources for local
needs [4] and empowering the end-users. Their
possibilities and diffusion could be magnified
repeatedly by introducing digital solutions as the
majority of the world population are equipped with
mobile devices [29]. Alternative currencies are hence
currencies that exist alongside state currencies and can
be divided into three groups often blurred and
alternative exchange systems can overlap with or be
part of each other: community currencies within a
neighborhood, local currencies within a region and
complementary currencies with an influence on the
economy as complementary to national currencies [14].
One specific form of an alternative currency is a
community currency, which is the focus of this work.
A well-studied German community currency
Chiemgauer [7, 53, 57] illustrates the basic functioning
principle behind it. 3500 individuals, 500 businesses,
and 300 associations participate in the Chiemgauerproject. To conduct transactions, customers can either
use a special debit card (“Regiocard”) or exchange

Page 4122

Euro into Chiemgauer paper notes. For every
transaction, a small percentage of the transaction value
is donated to a social organization [19]. In addition to
the donation, businesses pay a small fee for financing
the non-profit institution that manages the currency.
Moreover, a fee is required for paper bills older than
six months as well as re-exchanging the currency into
Euros.
Despite the success of the Chiemgauer project,
community currencies are facing challenges, with
many of them failing several years after their
introduction [54]. Digitalization can empower the
creation and survival of community currency projects
by different means such as online networks. However,
there is little to no guidance on how to capitalize on
these new opportunities.
Against this background, IS research can offer
solutions for the transition from paper-based to digital
community currencies (DCCs) and address challenges
of traditional community currencies such as the
inconvenience of handling two currencies in one wallet
and the geographic limitation to a limited user
population while creating a strong embeddedness in
local structures and enabling collaboration among
users. However, neither the research nor the
professional community has access to prescriptive
knowledge on the characteristics of DCC projects. In
this research, we ask the question: Which factors
influence the success of digital community currencies.
To demonstrate the design principles we furthermore
aim at applying the design principles to existing
community currencies.
In the spirit of design-oriented research in IS [23,
60], we aim at deriving design principles that can guide
or constrain [28] the development of future DCCs. To
do so, we conduct a literature review, analyze 16
community currency projects (Table 1), and study one
project at its end-of-life in more detail. The insights are
synthesized into actionable design principles [8]. The
design principles in this work lay the ground for
subsequent development of IT artifacts for sustainable
communities that utilize DCCs. In addition to this
synthetization, we have determined the degree of
digitalization of the studied community currency
projects. The individual projects are evaluated with a
classification of 0-2. 0 represents no digital support, 2
stands fo no physical form of the community currency
and 1 is a mix of physical and digital currency.

Table 1: List of community currency projects in
empirical analysis
Type of
currency

Degree
of
digitalization

Name

Country

Year

Chiemgauer
Regiogeld

DE

2002

Totnes
Pound

UK

2007

Elbtaler

DE

2012

Local
community
currency

1

Bristol
Pound

UK

2009

Local
community
currency

1

Curitiba

BR

1971

Local
community
currency

0

2

Local
community
currency
Local
community
currency

1

1

Sardex

IT

2010

Currency for
small and
medium sized
enterprises

Samen
Doen

NL

2014

Local
community
currency

2

Carlo

DE

2005

Local
community
currency

0

WIR

CH

1934

Bank for
small and
medium sized
enterprises

2

Dane
County
Timebank

US

2006

Mutual
Credit
System

2

2

EuroCat

ES

2013

Currency
measured
in trust /
endorsements

Fureai
Kippu

JP

1995

Healthcare
Currency

2

TradeQoin

NL

2013
2019

Currency for
business entrepreneurs

2

Sonantes

FR

2014

Local
community
currency

2

Exeter
Pound

UK

2014
2018

Local
community
currency

1
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2. Digital Community Currencies and
their Challenges
2.1. Dimensions of Digital Community
Currencies
In general, community currencies are alternative
currencies to the government cash and similar to local
currencies and complementary currencies [14]. By
definition, the three mainly differ by their focus on a
specific community for community currencies, a
specific territory for local currencies, or their influence
on the economy as complementary to national
currencies for complementary currencies (ibid). In
practice, the lines between alternative currencies and
related phenomena are often blurred and alternative
exchange systems can overlap with or be part of
community currency.
In order to get a clearer idea of the dimensions of
DCCs, the following section presents various projects
from Table 1 and classifies them according to their
different functionalities. Therefore, different forms of
currency systems can be distinguished by examining
their technological base [13].
First, simple technological architectures include
scriptural balances, online marketplaces, debit cards,
and point-of-sale. They all require an issuing
institution and thus a highly centralized organization.
The Comox Valley Local Exchange Trading System
(LETS) from Canada, established in 1985, was based
on simple scriptural balances in its beginnings [11, 48].
It is a mutual credit system (MCS) – a zero-balance
system, where “one person's credit equals another's
debit to the system, accounts always sum to zero and
both the value and utility of the currency is maintained
by trust in other members to meet their commitments”
[54]. Time banks like the Dane County Timebank for
exchanging hours of service between community
members can be based on simple technological
architecture as well.
In contrast to that, there are complex technical
architectures such as SMS, mobile applications,
internet banking, Near-Field-Communication (NFC)
and cryptocurrencies. They are complex as they all
enable a more decentral organization. Based on the
blockchain technology, social cryptocurrencies have
evolved. They are digital currencies offering solidarity
finance, which are distinct from DCCs mainly because
of excessively high growth and expansion rates without
geographic boundaries [14]. However, with community
currencies entering the digital world and
cryptocurrencies pursuing social goals, the line
between the two can be vague [50].

Second, the above-mentioned difference between
central or decentral organization structures is
manifested in the governance structure, which can be
shared or proprietary [13]. Shared governance can be
operated in the form of a community bank or
association such as Elbtaler. Proprietary governance,
on the other hand, can be found at TradeQoin, a private
company organizing a currency only for small and
medium-sized enterprises. Community currencies that
focus mostly on social and economic, sometimes
environmental goals, often base on voluntary and
activist-led structures and therefore have shared
governance [54].
Furthermore, governance structures vary across
DCCs depending on the design of currency
transactions between two parties. One-sided platforms
only allow transactions between members of the same
user group, such as the WIR-bank in Switzerland
between businesses. Two-sided platforms allow
transactions between different parties, e.g. businesses
and customers. Multi-sided systems reach from
transactions between individuals and the government,
integration of transport and telecommunication
services to care projects [13]. The introductory
example of Curitiba would be such a case.
Third, loyalty programs are not to be confused with
alternative currencies. They serve an economic
purpose, mainly establishing a commitment of a
customer for a brand/sponsor and thus lead to an
economic advantage [3]. Nevertheless, the general
reward and payment system is close to a currency
system and could possibly serve as an alternative
currency if specifically targeting a sustainability
purpose [10].
Finally, a characteristic that applies both to
alternative currencies and most national ones is
virtuality [21, 33]. Virtual does not necessarily mean
digital, but that it is not backed by any real-life
commodity such as gold [6, 24, 32]. Examples like the
Fureai Kippu can be found in Table 1. Virtual
currencies represent the so-called ‘fiat’-money. Fiat
describes “the practice of giving money value by the
mere executive decree of the state. Almost all world
currencies today are ey: they have value because
governments say so” [6].
Having distinguished and discussed the nature of
community currencies and their ‘relatives’, community
currencies enforce regional economic flows and
cooperation, increase the belonging to a community,
reduce emissions of transport and high-risk financial
speculation [18]. Four factors have been identified as
major contributions of community currencies for the
society and end-user empowerment: Reducing
inequality and social exclusion, supporting small and
medium-sized enterprises, positive environmental
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impact and the democratization of services and
organizations [10]. The Chiemgauer organization
states, that the currency builds stability for the
community: Even during and after the financial crisis
in 2008, it had stable turnovers about twice as high as
the Euro. This and hundreds of other examples of
community currency projects suggest, that a successful
community currency creates resilience [2, 22, 41, 49].
Resilience is “the ability of a system to sustain itself
through change via adaptation and occasional
transformation” [36]. If communities meet a large
share of their demand from local production and
facilitate exchange between members with an
alternative currency, their dependence from the global
economy declines and resilience grows [42].

2.2. Challenges
A literature review and the study of community
currency projects (Table 1) on academic literature
community currency projects reveal a plethora of
challenges for community currencies. These challenges
were identified in an iterative process of reviewing
individual sources including the literature and the
presented DCC platforms within the team of
participating researchers. An interview with the
manager of a deceased DCC platform provided an
exclusive view on specific challenges that have been
included in the following.
After an initial phase receiving regional
development funds and donations, unstable funding
streams are often a challenge for the platforms [46, 53].
Many community currencies serve the purpose of
strengthening the bond between members of the
community. In contrast, a digital platform holds the
risks of losing the community feeling and exclude
digitally illiterate users [13]. Another challenge is
networking
between
geographically
scattered
community currencies speaking different languages.
The language barrier has so far been a hurdle for
communication and information exchange in many
cases [54]. Also legal issues increase complexity when
introducing a DCC, as stated by a community currency
project manager: “To issue a digital version, for
regulatory compliance we would need to go through a
credit union, which we don't have in [town name], or to
apply to the Financial Services Authority for regulatory
approval, a very big process.” The full interview
transcript is not attached, as the text body would
exceed the page limitation.
In summary, the following four challenges can be
identified from the interview and the literature on
community currency and related phenomena as
presented in 2.1:

-

Unstable funding streams.
Loosing members in digital transformation.
Absence of a network for the exchange of
information.
Legal issues of the digitalization.

However, there are substantial differences between
existing types of community currencies. Within the
analyzed cases, there are monetary, time-based and
trust-based currencies. The diverse nature of the
systems, as well as their geographic particularities,
represent additional barriers for knowledge exchange
and adoption of lessons learned from other systems
[53].
All these challenges place a burden on community
currency projects. Failed projects show that after a
period of growing interest among community members
and funding entities, the inability of reaching a critical
mass leads to platforms ceasing operations in the long
run [54]. Six principles are introduced in the following,
which can guide the design of digital community
currencies. We build each principle upon the extant
research with the aim of addressing the discussed
challenges of the community currencies.

3. Design Principles for Digital
Community Currencies
3.1. Methodology
In the following section, the six design principles
for digital community currencies are presented, which
are taken from a literature review as well as an
interview with a community currency project manager
at the end of the project’s life. The literature review
was based on keyword combinations such as
“community / alternative / local / digital currency”,
“time bank”, “trading schemes”, “grassroot
innovations” were searched in the IS top basket,
conference proceedings (e.g. ACIS, AMCIS, HICSS,
ECIS, ICIS) and other IS outlets. Furthermore, a
backward and forward search in relevant literature
were used. As stated in the introduction, DCC apart
from cryptocurrency is not a mature research field in
the IS domain. Thus, most information was retrieved
from knowledge platforms such as the International
Journal of Community Currency Research (IJCCR). It
must be noted that not every challenge has been
observed in each DCC platform and academic
literature reported on the challenges to a different
extent. Within a team of three researchers, the
literature, as well as the knowledge platforms
concerning the DCC, were each independently
analyzed in order to conclude on common, coherent
principles in a joint discussion. The research represents
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the synthesis of most reoccurring challenges into
principles that can help to address these challenges.
These derived six design principles are illustrated
in Figure 1 and described in detail in the following
paragraphs. For some challenges as well as principles
there is however no proved solution and this
manuscript goes beyond the current status quo
mentioned in the introduction and proposes possible
innovative solutions.

Applying the principle of competitiveness turns the
tables as DCCs should establish strong market
mechanisms at the basis of the non-profit and
voluntary sector and set incentives for actors of the
market economy to compete for supply of social needs.
This supply can be complemented by multi-sided
transactions, which also allow for constant funding
streams.

3.3. Transparency and Self-government
Each organization depends on some form of
governance in the form of control [26]. Control is often
delegated to agents, which implies the danger of
disagreements between principal and agent [30]. The
danger lies within an asymmetry of information, which
can lead to high overhead costs and disparity or loss of
power (ibid). Community currencies with all types of
governance structures deal with control and delegation
as well as complex stakeholder interests [44]. A
possible way to circumvent the delegation of control is
full information and transparency so that stakeholders
can claim their interests and thereby exercise regulative
power [27]. Social commons, similar to public or
common goods, rely on collective action and selfmanagement [39].
A DCC should be a social common to root the DCC
within the community, prevent misuse and enable
transparency and self-government.

3.4. Circulation Velocity
Figure 1: Overview of design principles for digital
community currencies

3.2. Competitiveness
If goods are allocated in planned economies based
on socialist principles, history has shown that they are
designed to fail [38]. In contrast, competitive markets
have many buyers and sellers and prices are
determined by market mechanisms like supply and
demand, not by any superior entity [40]. They are
voluntary exchanges of money, goods, and services
and include benefits such as innovation, efficiency, and
freedom of individual choice [51]. This logic entails,
that no individual or business is interested in
conducting activities with low monetary rewards [55].
Community currencies usually operate in the nonprofit and voluntary sector, which is characterized by
unprofitable social activities such as healthcare and
education [1]. In contrast to the market economy,
demand for social activities is high and supply is low.

Money has multiple functions such as storing value,
being compact, dense, rare, easy to count and portable
[6, 56]. These functions are fundamental for enabling
exchanges in the market economy. However, they
bring the challenge of precautionary ‘hoarding’, which
can reduce the liquidity of an economy (change of
ownership in transactions)[25]. The challenge of
hoarding is magnified in the context of a DCC if the
community recognizes it as stable and resilient, which
is an important factor in the first place. One negative
example could be community members collecting
savings in the form of the DCC for their future
pension. An indicator for measuring whether
consumers and businesses are saving or spending is the
velocity of money, which is defined as the frequency
of transactions (the number of times one dollar is spent
to buy goods and services per unit of time) [16]. One
possible instrument to increase the frequency of
transactions is to degrade currency value over time
[20]. This mechanism can be an effective, yet for most
traditional consumers and economists too radical way
for increasing the circulation velocity.
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In practice, a DCC should include mechanisms,
which encourage users to spend instead of hoarding.
The digital design of a community currency can
provide diverse opportunities for such mechanisms.

3.5. Non-transferability
In the global economy, currencies serve the purpose
of transferring value between geographical and
geopolitical borders [47]. Economic unions and
institutions, as well as exchange rates, facilitate trade
for international companies [17]. Operating in a global
economy, a company can profit from the strong
purchasing power of customers while paying low
wages in countries with low social standards [15]. It is
the opposite of the idea of a local economy, which
accumulates local resources. This way, international
businesses can withdraw value from communities to
pay obligations in the form of debt and interest, which
have no connection to the community [4].
A DCC should exclude the possibility of reexchange it into any other currency to prevent
community members and businesses from extracting
value from the community.

3.6. Legitimacy
Governments can function as a barrier or as
empowerment towards innovation as they control tax,
financial, regulatory and monetary policy [31].
Especially innovative ideas that challenge existing
structures often have to cope with restrictive regulation
[9]. Community currencies can lead to such disruptive
innovations [35] and are therefore at risk to be held
back. For a DCC to be successful, it requires
confidence by the local population. An effective way
of creating trust in a monetary system is official
backing by the government [32]. This can be achieved
with the inclusion of the DCC in the tax system and
other official obligations, such as rents and wages.
Support of the local authority eases legal and
administrative hurdles and offers long-term funding
options to the managing organization.
DCCs should incorporate legitimacy by a design
that can gain official support of the local authority in
order to ensure the trust of the population in the DCC
and facilitate legal issues.

3.7. Self-organizing Locality
Community currencies develop independently with
different geographic focus and do commonly not
exchange information between projects [54]. That

leads to hundreds of community currency initiatives
fighting their challenges on their own [12]. The
transition of an analog to a digital world confronts
community currencies with similar obstacles, such as
the inclusion of digitally illiterate citizens [10]. DCC
prototypes and other knowledge could be shared in an
active online network with automated translation. Still,
every DCC would have to organize itself and maintain
its platform individually. DCC initiatives can extend
the scope of a community currency across the borders
of a local community. Meeting the suggested
principles, enhancing the local economy and global
sustainability at the same time is no longer a
contradiction. Lietaer et al. [33] shape the idea of an
ecosystem
of
purposeful
currencies,
which
complement national currencies. Those currencies aim
at social, environmental or economic sustainability.
There can be different options for a currency that has a
maximum value x and degrades with the increasing
factor y. One possible factor is distance: To set the
highest purchasing power of the currency, where
turnover is the highest and decrease with geographical
distance. Locations competing for the highest turnover
would have a positive impact as they target
sustainability purposes. The digital design of a DCC
allows for this kind of creative and complex solutions
and has no limits in terms of a village, city, country or
continent.
Accordingly, a DCC should not limit itself to a
local community but enable fluid borders through selforganizing locality so that participation is open to
every interested individual and economic entity to
enhance sustainability. This last principle is only
enabled by digital solutions and creates a completely
new context for the scope and impact of digital
community currencies.
As we are aware these design principles can be
seen as an initial set of principles drawn from
secondary literature. However, they are yet to be
validated, and their usefulness as a basis from which to
evaluate existing currencies is not demonstrated.
Because the design principles have not been validated,
it is impossible to know they are sufficiently
comprehensive in theory, or useful in practice. To do
so, we need to gather further primary data at this point
from yet to implement DCC platform of our own.

4. Validation of Design Principles
We applied the principles to the set of community
currency platforms listed in Table 1 in order to provide
an overview of principles that can be found within
platforms that currently operate in practice. To validate
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three researchers analyzed the projects independently
and discussed the presence of the proposed design
principles in several iterations.
The results shown in Table 2 represent the
consensus on the degree of design principle
implementation in each platform case. Therefore, we
introduced the following three possible states for a
community currency project:
+ for supporting the design principles,
- for not supporting the design principles and
~ for partial supporting the design principles.

Competitiveness

Transparency

Circulation

Nontransferability

Legitimacy

Locality

Table 2: Overview of applied principles on existing
community currencies

Co

T

Ci

N

Le

Lo

Chiemgauer
Regiogeld

+

+

+

-

+

+

Totnes
Pound

+

+

-

-

~

~

Elbtaler

+

+

~

+

~

~

Bristol
Pound

+

~

~

~

+

~

Curitiba

+

-

-

+

+

+

Sardex

+

~

~

+

+

-

SamenDoen

+

-

-

+

-

-

Carlo

+

+

+

-

~

-

WIR

-

-

-

-

-

-

Dane
County
Timebank

-

~

-

+

~

-

Fureai
Kippu

-

-

-

+

+

-

Sonantes

+

-

-

+

~

~

Platform --

Design
principle

Exeter
Pound

-

-

-

+

-

+

A closer look at the presence of these design
principles and the specifics with which they have been
implemented lead us to the following three major
observations.

4.1. Observation 1: Lack of Transparency
In line with the academic insights, community
platforms are challenged by establishing appropriate
organizational structures [43]. In most cases,
community currency platforms fail at disclosing the
organizational structures behind the project (T). For
instance, platforms like SamenDoen, WIR, and
EuroCat focus on explaining and advertising the
general idea of a community currency and leave the
explanation of how the organizational structure is
implemented and which roles and individuals are
behind the project. This signifies the lack of the
proposed transparency (T) and can lead to a lack of
trust among the potential participants. Such lack of
trust is a major impediment for the diffusion of the
currency within a community. [44]
A lack of trust can be furthermore driven by nontransparent business models behind the projects. For
instance, in the project SamenDoen, a point system was
observed. In this points system, each participant
receives points in accordance with his purchase value
in a participating store. The number of points for each
transaction depends only on the money spent in the
local store. These points can then be exchanged either
for further purchases, rewards or services [3]. Such a
point system for the purchase of local goods that is
structured as a community currency can lead to
economic interests arising within the organizational
structures by using customer data as a means of
financing the governing organization. This creates a
situation where project participants can quickly lose
trust in the platform and its governing organization.
Surprisingly only a few of the analyzed projects
provide transparency regarding the organizational
structures of the governing entity. For instance, the
Chiemgauer Regiogeld system explicitly implements
transparency (T)
and
facilitates
transparent
communication with the participants. The annual
general meeting and periodic meetings are announced
in advance, and all members are invited on a voluntary
basis [7, 57]. This facilitates confidence in the
community currency system in the Chiemgauer region.

4.2. Observation 2: Hidden Aim of Protecting
Capital from Inflation
In platforms like Totnes Pound, Bristol Pound, and
WIR, it is possible to obtain community currencies by
exchanging the national currency into community
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currency without a fee. Furthermore, if the community
currency does not have a time-value limit at all or the
time-value limit is longer than a year. This lacks the
incentive to quickly put the community currency back
into circulation except that it does not receive an
interest rate and will store the value [6, 56]. Only the
personal attitude and belonging to the community
serves as an incentive to use the community currency.
This does not support circulation (Ci) as the
community currency rest unused for the community.
Eventually, this stored community currency can be
converted back into the national currency which is not
recommended in die design principles of digital
community currencies.
This combination of missing implementations of an
incentive for the community currency circulation as
well as the lack of non-transferability (N) can lead to a
possibility of using the community currency as an
investment with indirect interest rates due to inflation
[25]. Purchasing a community currency against the
national currency at a given time creates a fixed value
of the money invested. If this community money is
exchanged into national currency after a certain period
of time, the real purchasing power can be increased.
This effect can motivate participants to engage with the
currency yet prevents the community currency to
strengthen the community and would likely cause a
skeptical assessment of the currency by legislators
(Le).

4.3. Observation 3: Risk of Movement from
Complementary towards Substitute
Currency
On platforms with digital community currencies,
there are currently no restrictions on the usability of the
currency from other regions. For example, currencies
such as the Totnes Pound and Sonantes can be bought
analogously and digitally by the national currency.
These community currencies can then be used by
companies as a means of payment. For instance, the
Totnes Pound project emphasizes that the system is
designed for the city of Totnes, but also a wider
distribution is set as a goal for this community
currency. This is not in line with the locality (Lo). This
approach and the supra-regional (supra-urban) use of
digital community currencies could lead to creating a
substitute for a national currency, which is not the aim
of community currencies [14].
One of the main goals of community currencies is
to strengthen a region, a city or a neighborhood. In
doing so, it is important to clearly define the term
‘region’ and adhere to this definition [13, 46]. Thus,
the community currency of the Sonantes platform can
be used in the entire Pays-de-la-Loire region (as far as

companies participate) and is thus available in the
entire federal state of France. This can already be seen
as supra-regional, as the potential community behind it
is too heterogeneous with different challenges. The
lack of a community aspect is a step towards having an
alternative currency – something that could likely
cause skeptical assessment of the currency by
legislators (Le) and is not the initial goal of community
currency. Going back to the suggested principles of
self-organizing locality (subsection 3.7), such supraregional developments of community currencies are
problematic as they lose the principle of locality (Lo)
by assigning same value for a currency unit in the
entire regions. Contrarily, self-organizing locality
facilitates local transactions by assigning higher value
to a purposeful currency unit for transactions [33] that
are initiated close to where the unit was generated.

5. Discussion and Next Steps
The six design principles of Figure 1 presented in
this work can have major implications for existing and
future DCCs on the identified challenges. They enforce
knowledge sharing between community currency
projects and expand existing regional boundaries. Both
on a small and large scale, the proposed principles can
bring resilience and sustainability transformation to
societies. The diffusion of digital technologies and
focus on local economies can reduce dependence on
high-risk mechanisms of the global financial economy
as well as strengthen the collaboration among
individuals of a community by providing a reward
system for the participants. DCCs being a social
phenomenon that can empower the end-user of IS, the
design principles extend also the research area of
Green IS, which mostly focused on environmental
aspects of sustainability to date. Nevertheless, it is to
investigate why certain community currencies failed to
keep running as well as determine the problems some
of the community currency platforms ran into that
leads to the decision to shut down the online support of
the currency. Furthermore, future work will have to
examine whether the design principles are equally
applicable to every community currency project, or
whether they need to be differentiated on a case-bycase basis.
The research is currently bound to a limited number
of DCCs selected among academic literature as the
overwhelming majority of community currencies still
operates at least partly with paper bills. Furthermore,
information about empirical cases does almost
exclusively base on secondary information available.
In future work, we are going to collect empirical data
from the implementation of a DCC to verify the design
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principles as well as validating the challenges of
community currencies from chapter 4.
The major limitation of this work is the lack of
extensive evaluation of the design principles. The
source for the principles is primarily academic
literature that supports chosen design principles from
the theoretical point of view. Although we were able to
find support for the design principles in the interview
material, an extensive evaluation of the design
principles is required. On the one hand, a greater
number of interviews and workshops with experts need
to be performed where the design principles can be
presented and extensively discussed. Second,
prototypes of DCC platforms that follow the presented
design principles need to be developed and evaluated
against the existing platforms. These steps combined
with the implementation of the principles in a realworld community can be subsumed under the method
of Action Design Research [52]. With the proposed
design principles, we hope to spur discourse on the
phenomenon of digital community currencies within
the IS community and to contribute to the architecture
and the design of resilient communities of tomorrow.
Moreover, a concluding statement on how valid the
design principles are having to be made in future work
with this complete implementation of the principles
and a detailed examination of the implemented design
principles.
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